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Abstract 
The labor market in the Dominican Republic is in disarray. There has been a high rate of 
unemployment and a very high rate of non-participation within the labor force for years. Output 
growth has been steady in manufacturing, telecommunication, and financial services, and new 
jobs have been added in the service sector consistently, however these gains have led to no real 
increase in available quality jobs and wage stagnation (Williams & Adedeji, 2004). Abdullaev 
and Marcello (2013) describe a dichotomous approach to solving the problem; through targeted 
education for the long term and through product market reforms in the near term. 
The energy sector in the Dominican Republic is a prime example of an area where 
reforms are needed to improve the operating environment to spur and sustain growth. At present 
the losses in transmission and distribution are significantly higher than in most places as a result 
of fraud (Smith 2004). Until recently it has not been against the law to steal electricity (Enerdata 
2011). The rationale being that if electricity is a basic human right we cannot punish those who 
attempt to gain it. This lack of property law within the context of electricity underpins a 
significant failure by the government when viewed from the point of the electricity producers. 
Property ownership is a fundamental concept of free markets. Without ownership rights there is 
no (or limited) ability to charge for goods produced with that property. Electricity is a 
commodity property and without the ability to effectively charge for its consumption the 
producers have struggled. 
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Overview 
The electricity market is dominated by three producers (one government owned and two 
private) and two distributors (again, one government owned). The US State Department reports 
in “Dominican Republic” (2015) that some electricity producers are severely undercapitalized 
and are often unable to purchase fuel. This failure of the competitive free market due to 
regulation failure reduces the demand for labor within the sector by reducing profit from 
existing, and incentive for future, generation capacity. Although there are several hydro, wind, 
and gas plants being constructed, they are small in scale, and these renewable plants receive 
significant offsets from the government (enough to offset the downside of the inability to gain 
rents from produced output). 
Resolving the ownership rights problem in the electricity sector should act grow the 
economy as a whole. Those jobs have failed to grow in recent years with the growth in 
manufacturing, telecommunications, and financial. Real wages in these industries have likewise 
stagnated. These forces combine to reduce the incentive to work.  
Abdullaev and Marcello (2013) report that the education intensity for the electricity, gas, 
and water sector is the fourth highest, indicating that within the sectors evaluated, this one has 
the fourth highest rate of at least high school completion. Their regression analysis shows that for 
every year increase in educational attainment a male is 3.2% more likely and a female 10.8% 
more likely to participate in the labor force. These new jobs created through growth within the 
electricity sector will pull those workers (higher educated) back into the labor force. This has 
long range effects on the economy as a whole. Higher labor force participation increases total 
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output and wages, increasing investment and consumption, increasing future capital stock, which 
can be then used to further increase output. 
Policy Evaluation 
One of the underlying tenets of Keynesian economics is the idea that government fiscal 
policy should act to shore up the economy through spending during recessions and rebuild its 
surplus through reduced spending during times of growth. To some degree the government of the 
Dominican Republic has done that within the electricity sector by providing tax offsets for new 
generation (renewable). Another key tenet of Keynesian economics is that unemployment can 
only occur through market inefficiencies. This is a case where that may hold true, although the 
New Keynesian models offer the reason for unemployment as sticky prices and wages, this is a 
case where there is a clear link between policy and growth. Government failure to secure 
ownership rights for electricity produced has created the market environment that has made it 
nearly impossible for the existing producers to expand without help (tax assistance), and in some 
cases to even pay their bills (United States Department of State, 2015). This environment does 
not promote the hiring of new employees. Although this is only one segment, and Keynes 
preferred to view the economy as a whole, the actions within this segment may speak to the 
overall climate in the economy. 
The monetarist view would be that: an increase in real wages through expanded labor 
force participation should result in increased aggregate demand. Higher consumption increases 
the liquidity of the market, increasing the availability of money. Without government 
intervention the increased liquidity will result in inflation (although this would be moderated by 
the fact that currently the economy is in an underemployment equilibrium). Government 
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intervention should be to increase interest rates or sell securities, thus reducing the money 
supply, thus curbing inflation. Attempting to correct the underemployment through stimulative 
policies (loosening money supply) would not resolve the underlying policy related cause 
(property rights) and would only act to exacerbate any subsequent inflationary pressure. This 
policy, however is not directly related to the policy of fixing property rights, but rather to the 
outcome of that change.  
The neo-classicalist view would be that: this policy amounts to an actual change in labor 
effectiveness and in labor (Rapaczynski, 1996). Business cycles result from shock to the various 
factors of output, however real growth can only be achieved through the increased effectiveness 
of labor (assuming that labor supplied is maximized). In this scenario, labor supplied is not 
maximized as labor force participation is low. Unemployment is much greater than its natural 
rate. As opposed to Keynesians, neo-classicalists don’t see labor as the product (demanded by 
firms and supplied by workers) but rather see jobs as the product, supplied by firms and 
demanded by workers (Hoover, 1990). By shifting the supply and demand to the opposite sides, 
many of the Keynesian problems with unemployment go away (specifically that there is no 
unemployment without market inefficiencies). In this case there truly are market inefficiencies 
caused by the government, so both sides see the problem. Reducing unemployment to its natural 
rate (those changing jobs, transitioning from school, raising children, etc.) acts to increase the 
amount of available labor. Increasing the number of high paying high education required jobs 
through the policy discussed above also acts to increase the aggregate effectiveness of labor, 
which we have discussed causes real output growth. Beside the increase in labor supplied, there 
is an increase in its effectiveness as well. Improving the policy that allows the labor to produce a 
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profit earning output acts to cause real growth. Both of these impacts are in the same direction 
and will thus act to enhance the effect of the other. 
All three of the models predict that increasing labor force participation will result in real 
growth of the economy. Although they predict it for different reasons, and in the Keynesian case, 
go so far as to say that the unemployment shouldn’t be possible in the first place (without 
governmental failure), they all tend to agree that this policy (ownership rights) will have a 
positive effect. The idea of ownership rights are so fundamental to the notion of a free market, 
that nearly all practitioners agree that the very idea of the free market fails without it 
(Rapaczynski, 1996). As such, any of the three choices would help us arrive at the final 
destination. Improved property rights can be viewed as a step increase in technology (innovation, 
labor effectiveness, etc.).  
Solow’s growth model (and those built on it) suggest that long term growth can only be 
accomplished through improvements in labor effectiveness (Romer, 2012), thus if we treat 
property ownership rights as an improvement in labor effectiveness, growth should follow. Using 
that assumption the implications of such a change will be investigated using the simplified Real 
Business Cycle model described by Romer (2012, p. 201). This model ignores governmental 
spending and assumes depreciation of 100% per period; although these do not reflect the real 
world, they do provide a means for solving for equilibrium changes caused by changes to inputs 
that should at least approximate the scale and direction of the resultant overall change.  
Macroeconomic Forecast 
The model suggested by Romer (2012, p.201) acts as the starting point for the forecast 
that this paper will develop in response to correcting the property ownership rights issue 
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described. As described previously, the improvement in property rights is assumed to equate to 
an improvement in labor effectiveness. Romer’s baseline real business cycle model specifically 
excludes governmental actions and assumes 100% depreciation per period. We assume that 
government intake (taxes) are spent in the same period at 100%, thus eliminating the need to 
model government actions. We also assume that capital (K) in time t is a function of output (Y) in 
time t-1, by doing so we show capital as being directly equal to savings (s) and eliminate the 
need to model interest or depreciation. This model is not indicative of real world conditions, 
however, as it is focused on a specific sector, and accounts for a small percentage of aggregate 
output, it should yield results on the appropriate scale and trending in the correct direction.  
Treating output as a Cobb-Douglas function (with constant returns to scale) and given 
real GDP, population, and labor force participation rates leaves initial capital, labor 
effectiveness, and output elasticities as the only unknowns. Romer’s assumption (2012) of 100% 
depreciation reduces capital to the output times the saving rate in the previous period, as we have 
GDP and saving rate, we can calculate capital level. Data obtained from the World Bank’s 
website (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases.aspx) provides GDP, saving rate, 
population, and labor force participation rate for 2000 to 2015. The 2000 GDP and saving rate 
data were then used to estimate 2001 capital level (all values in 2015 US Dollars) at 
US$4,329,403,750. This same formulation was used to estimate capital for all periods (using an 
average saving rate and projected outputs capital is estimated for future periods as well, see 
Appendix A). With capital solved for, it was next assumed that labor effectiveness in 2001 (t=1) 
was 10000 (this allowed capital output elasticity to be near 1/3 as suggested by Romer (2012)). 
At this point the only variable left in the 2001 production function was output elasticity, with 
production having been assumed to take the form 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡
𝛼(𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡)
1−𝛼 solving for output elasticity 
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is a simple logarithmic equality. This output elasticity is assumed to be constant for all time 
periods, with this assumption, and knowing capital, labor, and output for 2015, labor 
effectiveness was solved for. Knowing labor effectiveness (A) in 2015 and in 2001, and 
assuming a fixed percentage growth rate (as in the Solow growth model) it becomes easy to 






] − 1). This yields a labor effectiveness growth rate of 5.718%. 
Labor force growth is likewise calculated from actual data (for use in projection date) at 1.52% 
as is average saving rate at 18.18%.  
With all variables calculated or estimated the fit of the model was tested. Output 
predicted by the model (Y*) was compared to actual GDP. The Solow Residual (Appendix B) 
was larger than 10% of actual GDP in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007, however averaged less than 
1% over the 14 year period. Although not a perfect model, the standard deviation for percentage 
error was 14%, it is on average very close to actual output. Since predicting cyclic variations is 
not the goal, rather predicting the growth trend as a result of this specific policy change is, this 
model is found to be acceptable for that purpose. Shocks that result in output not fitting the 
model are to be expected over a timeframe of 14 years. Variation in labor growth, capital growth, 
labor effectiveness, savings rate, etc. are to be expected, however, as discussed, since this model 
is intended to evaluate the trend resulting from a proposed change, these variations from the 
trend can be ignored. 
Having specified the model and established values for all parameters the step change in 
labor effectiveness resulting from fixing property rights was needed. In Dominican Republic - 
Distribution Grid Modernization and Loss Reduction Project (2015) the World bank established 
the electricity sector as having 2014 sales of DR$69855M with lost revenue of DR$40152.87M. 
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Using an exchange rate of 46.4 DR$/US$ lost revenue amounted to US$865M or approximately 
1.35% of GDP. Using the model values for 2014 to solve for the required step increase in labor 
effectiveness (A) to offset this lost output results in an increase of 1.9764%. Two models are 
estimated from 2015 onward, one with and one without the step increase in labor effectiveness 
(Appendix C). 
Economic theory suggests that a step increase in labor effectiveness should result in 
increased overall growth. As opposed to a one time shock, the resultant increase in growth 
should be persistent. Capital should follow output levels (lagged by one period) and output 
should stabilize at a level above that which it would naturally reach by a percentage equal to the 
percentage size of the step increase in labor effectiveness (assuming constant returns to scale, 
which we have done) (Hoover, 1990 & Romer, 2012). The model specified for this analysis 
shows output in the form of GDP rising to 1.9764% above its projected non-intervention level 
within 10 years, capital rising to the same percentage increase lagged by one year from output, 
and labor effectiveness rising by the same 1.9764% in one year (step increase) and staying at that 
percentage level above where it otherwise would have been. The results of the model fit in 
direction and scale with the theory. 
This overall growth in the economy, above what it would have grown, will result in 
decreased unemployment through several means. Increased demand faced by the electricity 
sector will directly result in increased employment opportunities. The follow on effects felt 
throughout the economy (increased purchasing power, lower electricity prices, etc.) will have 
further positive effects on employment. Inflationary pressure will tend to decrease 
unemployment, however in this case, unemployment is not the issue, but rather low labor force 
participation. This model assumes that available labor grows at a steady percentage over time 
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(implicitly assuming a constant labor force participation rate of 64.6%), the growth predicted, 
however should act to increase labor force participation. As discussed prior the causes of low 
labor force participation are myriad, however, any change that improves the competitiveness of 
the wages within the electricity sector will attract workers. Should labor force participation rate 
rise the effects seen would be amplified by ∆𝐿1−𝛼. 
Industry Analysis 
 Applying the same model as used for the economy as a whole to the electrical sector 
should reveal a rough estimation of what to expect from that specific portion of the economy. 
Assuming that capital and labor in the sector are proportional to the whole economy by the same 
rate that output is proportional (the electrical sector would account for approximately 3.71% of 
GDP without the lost revenue associated with property rights deficiencies), and assuming that 
output elasticity and labor effectiveness are the same values should produce a useful prediction 
over the same time period.  
 Applying the reasoning above to the 2014 data yields a predicted pre-change output for 
the sector of US$2,327M versus an actual output of US$2,370M, or a 1.8% discrepancy in 
predicted versus actual. This suggests that the application of the ratio version of the model to the 
sector should provide a projection nearly as accurate as that obtained for the economy as a 
whole. Based on this fact, the same time period (2015 through 2024) has been evaluated. The 
largest difference between the sector level model and the economy level model is the valuation 
of labor effectiveness, the 2014 economy level model value produced the 2014 estimation above, 
so is retained for the pre-policy level. Using the same methodology to determine the post-change 
labor effectiveness as used for the larger model (working backwards to labor effectiveness by 
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increasing output by the amount of lost revenue) yields a 26,272% increase in labor effectiveness 
for this sector. This larger change causes the stabilization time to increase to approximately 15 
years and the new output to be about 24,851.02% above where it would have been otherwise 
(Appendix D). 
 This drastic increase in billable output will directly result in increased profit for the 
sector, as with this change all output will be paid for (versus now, where only 63.5% is paid for). 
This increase in profit will improve the condition for existing firms and create incentive for new 
firms to enter the market. The increased competition will put downward pressure on prices until 
a new equilibrium level is attained, the decreased prices will likewise place upward pressure on 
demand creating more incentive to enter the market. Eventually the rise in demand, will be met 
by an increase in supply at some new price level below the current level. This reduction in prices 
will increase the purchasing power for consumers. The influx of cash into the economy will have 
ramifications for interest rates and inflation, however is assumed to be adequately dealt with by 
the Dominican central bank.  
Conclusion 
 The correction of property ownership rights has been discussed as a correction for 
electricity sector woes before. Abdullaev and Estevao (2013), Enerdata (2011), and Dominican 
Republic - Distribution Grid Modernization and Loss Reduction Project (2015) all specifically 
call for this policy correction. Smith (2004) describes the effects of electricity theft on an 
economy and Rapaczynski (1996) makes the case for the importance of property rights as a 
whole.  
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 The models derived and discussed above make a compelling argument for correcting this 
market failure. Property ownership is a fundamental upon which free markets are built 
Rapaczynski (1996), without which there can be no free markets as we know them. In this case 
the failure to secure property rights for a specific sector has resulted in significant losses to that 
sector and substantial losses to the economy as a whole. 
 The models presented are simplistic and ignore large swaths of the economy and the 
factors that affect growth and stability. This does not reduce their worth, however, as these 
models are built on solid theory and are intended only to address the impact of a specific change 
to a specific industry. Since they are so specific in nature, and treat as exogenous so much of the 
economy their predictions should not be taken as necessarily precise or accurate in scale, but 
should be treated as accurate in direction. Ceteris Paribas, these models may reflect actual 
growth, however it is impossible to hold all other things constant. That being said, the general 
direction and possibly size of the growth created from this change should be reflected within the 
projections given. 
 The policy change could be implemented for effectively no cost. The long term effects 
would need to be monitored by the central bank and inflationary pressure accounted for as 
desired. Since this is correcting a market failure, and not attempting to force the market to 
behave contrary to its innate desires, there are few negative side effects to consider. Beyond 
expanded money supply and the attendant inflation caused by same, the outcomes are positive; 
increased purchasing power for consumers, lower electricity prices for consumers, more 
competition, increased profits for producers, and increased labor force participation. As a result, 
this policy improvement should be enacted as soon as possible.   
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Appendix A: Macro variables without policy change 
Year  K (est)  L A α 
2001  $       4,329,403,750.34  5531372.64 10000.00 0.313414 
2002  $       4,367,985,372.22  5643830.89 10571.79 0.313414 
2003  $       4,654,878,752.96  5757301.00 11176.26 0.313414 
2004  $       4,056,320,940.27  5871433.07 11815.31 0.313414 
2005  $       4,170,093,443.74  5976704.27 12490.89 0.313414 
2006  $       4,545,651,931.83  6081995.26 13205.10 0.313414 
2007  $       5,038,373,408.84  6187322.59 13960.15 0.313414 
2008  $     10,094,252,424.41  6273355.49 14758.37 0.313414 
2009  $       9,775,658,275.06  6358796.64 15602.23 0.313414 
2010  $       9,029,874,136.24  6423791.12 16494.34 0.313414 
2011  $     10,592,544,277.80  6507614.01 17437.46 0.313414 
2012  $     10,378,492,951.82  6590618.52 18434.51 0.313414 
2013  $     10,279,685,823.98  6672633.95 19488.57 0.313414 
2014  $     10,994,375,088.58  6753457.17 20602.89 0.313414 
2015  $     11,719,382,994.77  6832925.76 21780.94 0.313414 
*2016  $     12,196,594,500.23  8680629.46 23026.34 0.313414 
*2017  $     15,122,305,483.70  11068189.36 24342.95 0.313414 
*2018  $     19,857,133,894.85  14164682.09 25734.84 0.313414 
*2019  $     26,615,033,724.42  18195599.94 27206.32 0.313414 
*2020  $     35,995,585,611.88  23462808.90 28761.94 0.313414 
*2021  $     48,947,795,142.81  30371962.80 30406.50 0.313414 
*2022  $     66,851,343,695.83  39470305.31 32145.10 0.313414 
*2023  $     91,675,006,434.74  51499001.68 33983.11 0.313414 
*2024  $  126,221,352,716.40  67465874.48 35926.22 0.313414 
*Projections based on fixed percentage growth rates for population and labor effectiveness. 
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Appendix B: Solow Residuals 
Year Y* (est) Y (act) Solow Residual (Y-Y*) Residual % 
2001 24892595799 24892595799 -0.26203537 0% 
2002 26294153898 26571659051 277505152.7 1% 
2003 28250969108 21277171990 -6973797118 -33% 
2004 28492585975 22039210346 -6453375629 -29% 
2005 30225660100 34004081037 3778420937 11% 
2006 32651298216 35952890849 3301592634 9% 
2007 35449310132 44073886687 8624576555 20% 
2008 46226232999 48152993004 1926760006 4% 
2009 47988463886 48193458083 204994196.4 0% 
2010 48971955110 53864484468 4892529359 9% 
2011 53965784747 58361928552 4396143805 8% 
2012 56195159634 60595109805 4399950171 7% 
2013 58703566622 61198323069 2494756447 4% 
2014 62803409394 63968906782 1165497388 2% 
2015 67103263863 67103263863 0.39263916 0% 
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Appendix C: Growth Estimates 
Year  GDP   GDP*  dY%  K (est)   K*  dK% L L* dL% A A* dA% 
2001  $     24,892,595,798.72       $       4,329,403,750.34      5531372.64     10000.00     
2002  $     26,571,659,051.21       $       4,367,985,372.22      5643830.89     10571.79     
2003  $     21,277,171,990.41       $       4,654,878,752.96      5757301.00     11176.26     
2004  $     22,039,210,346.13       $       4,056,320,940.27      5871433.07     11815.31     
2005  $     34,004,081,037.34       $       4,170,093,443.74      5976704.27     12490.89     
2006  $     35,952,890,849.45       $       4,545,651,931.83      6081995.26     13205.10     
2007  $     44,073,886,687.23       $       5,038,373,408.84      6187322.59     13960.15     
2008  $     48,152,993,004.29       $     10,094,252,424.41      6273355.49     14758.37     
2009  $     48,193,458,082.84       $       9,775,658,275.06      6358796.64     15602.23     
2010  $     53,864,484,468.23       $       9,029,874,136.24      6423791.12     16494.34     
2011  $     58,361,928,552.03       $     10,592,544,277.80      6507614.01     17437.46     
2012  $     60,595,109,805.05       $     10,378,492,951.82      6590618.52     18434.51     
2013  $     61,198,323,068.97       $     10,279,685,823.98      6672633.95     19488.57     
2014  $     63,968,906,782.07       $     10,994,375,088.58      6753457.17     20602.89     
2015  $     67,103,263,863.39   $     68,011,028,641.33  1.3528%  $     11,719,382,994.77   $     11,719,382,994.77  0.0000% 6832925.76 6832925.76 0.0000% 21780.94 22211.41 1.9764% 
2016  $     83,199,950,204.98   $     84,681,346,468.63  1.7805%  $     12,196,594,500.23   $     12,361,588,544.71  1.3528% 8680629.46 8680629.46 0.0000% 23026.34 23481.43 1.9764% 
2017  $  109,250,044,779.66   $  111,342,134,571.77  1.9150%  $     15,122,305,483.70   $     15,391,561,977.07  1.7805% 11068189.36 11068189.36 0.0000% 24342.95 24824.06 1.9764% 
2018  $  146,430,680,359.10   $  149,296,510,873.60  1.9571%  $     19,857,133,894.85   $     20,237,389,181.76  1.9150% 14164682.09 14164682.09 0.0000% 25734.84 26243.46 1.9764% 
2019  $  198,040,631,683.86   $  201,942,713,872.76  1.9703%  $     26,615,033,724.42   $     27,135,923,032.62  1.9571% 18195599.94 18195599.94 0.0000% 27206.32 27744.02 1.9764% 
2020  $  269,301,140,815.86   $  274,618,459,241.18  1.9745%  $     35,995,585,611.88   $     36,704,822,561.39  1.9703% 23462808.90 23462808.90 0.0000% 28761.94 29330.38 1.9764% 
2021  $  367,802,943,316.12   $  375,069,944,609.99  1.9758%  $     48,947,795,142.81   $     49,914,263,432.56  1.9745% 30371962.80 30371962.80 0.0000% 30406.50 31007.45 1.9764% 
2022  $  504,377,852,876.69   $  514,345,335,951.59  1.9762%  $     66,851,343,695.83   $     68,172,183,591.11  1.9758% 39470305.31 39470305.31 0.0000% 32145.10 32780.41 1.9764% 
2023  $  694,445,054,831.88   $  708,169,519,788.45  1.9763%  $     91,675,006,434.74   $     93,486,682,085.88  1.9762% 51499001.68 51499001.68 0.0000% 33983.11 34654.75 1.9764% 
2024  $  960,001,235,965.56   $  978,974,327,907.30  1.9764%  $  126,221,352,716.40   $  128,715,892,090.07  1.9763% 67465874.48 67465874.48 0.0000% 35926.22 36636.25 1.9764% 
All values in 2015 US Dollars. 
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Appendix D: Electricity Sector Projection 
 2015* 2016* 2017* 2028* 2029* 
 with step increase     
L* 253246.556 306001.57 370811.85 3758559.22 4731708.64 
K* 434351768.339 19997826429.59 78566625126.29 2333045417318.15 3089594852168.03 
A* 5434566.151 5745306.52 6073814.56 11196778.81 11836993.89 
alpha 0.313 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Y* 110024107431.497 432258117343.85 786779094397.35 16998343151517.80 22587724255642.00 
      
      
 without step increase     
L* 253246.556 306001.57 370811.85 3758559.22 4731708.64 
K* 434351768.339 452038506.74 541516526.24 9350515032.07 12382644620.25 
A 21780.936 23026.34 24342.95 44875.03 47440.92 
alpha 0.313 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Y* 2487026947.853 2979317410.77 3737330814.38 68126875027.18 90528267327.49 
      
% 
difference 
43.2392100039 144.0862925117 209.5189862696 248.5100963421 248.5101797755 
All values in 2015 US Dollars. 
